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DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
ON THE STATE LEVEL; ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION IN NEW MEXICO: PUBLIC SERVICE
CO. OF NEW MEXICO et al. v. NEW MEXICO
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT BOARD'
THE CASE
For over a decade the State of New Mexico, the Federal govern-
ment, and power companies of New Mexico, Texas, California and
Arizona have argued over the appropriate standards which could be
adopted to assure New Mexico "clean air," and still allow the opera-
tion of coal gas fired electrical generating power plants in the Four
Corners area. In 1975, the New Mexico Environmental Improvement
Board attempted to enforce an amendment adopted by the Board in
December, 1974,2 which was aimed at lowering the allowable level
of sulfur dioxide emissions of existing coal burning equipment.
The previous regulation,3 adopted in 1972, simply placed a
numbered level amount4 of emissions which when reached meant
any owner or operator of coal burning equipment in that area was
then in violation of the standards and regulations. The 1972 regula-
tion meant operators of existing coal burning equipment in the Four
Corners Area could run their plants at the near maximum allowed
pollutant levels, effectively preventing operation of any additional
equipment. The new regulation attempted to conform to existing
federal air quality standards as well as placing an equal burden upon
the power companies as to the amount of emissions allowed for each
particular piece of equipment. The action of the Board in adopting
the amendment prompted appeals by the public service companies.
Alleging the Board's enactment of the regulation was not in accor-
dance with the law, the companies appealed seeking judicial review
1. PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW MEXICO, a New Mexico Corporation, and
Tucson Gas and Electric Company, an Arizona Corporation, v. New Mexico Environmental
Improvement Board, and ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, El Paso Electric
Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Salt River Project Agricultural Improve-
ment and Power District, Southern California Edison Company and Tucson Gas and Electric
Company v. Environmental Improvement Board, State of New Mexico, 89 N.M. 223, 549
P.2d 638 (Ct. App. 1976).
2. New Mexico Environmental Improvement Board, Ambient Air Quality Standards and
Air Quality Control Regulations, § 602, adopted December 13, 1974.
3. New Mexico Health and Social Services Board, Ambient Air Quality Standards and Air
Quality Control Regulations, § 602, adopted March 25, 1972.
4. Id. ".. . no person owning or operating... coal burning... equipment... shall
permit, cause, suffer or allow sulfur dioxide emissions ... in excess of one pound per
million British Thermal Units of heat input."
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of the Board's ruling. Two separate suits were filed which were later'
consolidated by the Court of Appeals.'
At the appellate review, the Board gave the following reasons for
adopting the amendment:
A. To require 65% and 85%, and later in 1979, 90% sulfur dioxide
control on existing smaller and larger coal burning equipment,
respectively, will protect welfare, property, and the public in-
terest by reducing the significance of air quality as a limiting
factor to economic growth. By reducing the amount of sulfur
dioxide permitted in the air from existing sources, more room
will be made available, up to the state sulfur dioxide standard,
for new industry in the Four Corners area.
B. The United States Environmental Protection Agency has required
70% sulfur dioxide control on coal burning equipment at Four
Corners. In order for New Mexico to regain control over its air in
the Four Corners region, the State must promulgate its own
regulations, which must be approved by the Environmental
Protection Agency. Those state regulations must be at least as
strict as the E.P.A.'s under the requirements of the Federal Clean
Air Act.
C. The 70% sulfur dioxide control required by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency is technically practicable and
economically reasonable.
D. The 65%, 85% and 90% emission controls have been shown to be
technically practicable and economically reasonable and are
attainable within the time frames set forth by the extension of
time for reaching 90% control to two years.
E. By extending the time limitations for reaching 90% control to
1979, the Board feels industry will have the time it needs to test
its equipment and get it properly working.
F. There is evidence to describe how a single source may preempt
other sources if it is allowed to contaminate up to the standards.
G. There is evidence to show that a higher controlled efficiency is
necessary because of the effects of visibility.6
Judge Hernandez, writing the majority opinion for the Court of
Appeals, questioned the legality of each of the six reasons in turn.
Reasons "A," "B," and "F," he found, arise from the Board's
recognition of the likelihood of more development in the Four
Corners area. Because of that development, the Board considered
that a reduction in the present sulfur dioxide standards would allow
the accommodation of new industry. Judge Hernandez found there is
5. Cause No. 1922 and No. 1923.
6. Supra note 1.
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nothing in the Board's mandate which would give it authority to plan
for this future development. He states:
The authority granted an administrative agency should be construed
so as to permit the fullest accomplishment of the legislative intent or
policy-Carrol v. Tarburton, 209 A.2d 86 (Del. 1965). However,
such an approach to construction does not warrant allowing an
administrative agency to amend or enlarge its authority under the
guise of making rules and regulations.7
Judge Hernandez considered reasons "D" and "E" relevant, but
only if it could be shown necessary to adopt the modification of the
Regulation. After reviewing the testimony of the expert witnesses for
both sides, Judge Hernandez noted that: " . . . it is not a court's
function to substitute its opinion for that of the administrative
boards. ... However, this is in situations where there is a difference
or a conflict in the evidence, not a complete absence. '"8
After referring to § 12-12-12, N.M.S.A., 1953, 9 Judge Hernandez
decided that there was no evidence in the record to show any neces-
sity or "need," for changing the present statute. As to reason "C,"
Judge Hernandez found "no relevancy in this context."' I
Judge Hernandez summarily dismissed reason "G," finding
nothing in the record to support the Board's final reasoning. He
refers to Webster's Dictionary' 1 finding that sulfur dioxide is a
"heavy colorless, nonflammable gas" and then concludes that the
record contains no evidence to show that the gas can combine with
other elements to become visible.
After having reviewed the dissenting opinion of Judge Lopez,
Judge Hernandez attempts to elucidate his opinion "lest others be-
come confused."' 2
The board having set a standard is bound by it.. . . 13 It has the
continuing authority to change the standard, after proper notice and
hearing, and to adopt regulations to implement or explain it. How-
ever, it may not set a new standard or adopt regulations implement-
ing or explaining it for any reason other than to "prevent or abate
air pollution.
7. Supra note 1, at 642.
8. Supra note 1, at 644.
9. § 12-12-13, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl. Vol. 3, Supp. 1975) states in part: "Upon appeal,
the Court of Appeals shall set aside the regulation only if found to be ... not supported by
substantial evidence in the transcript."
10. Supra note 1, at 642.
11. As cited in the opinion: "Webster's Third International Dictionary, Unabridged
(1971)."
12. Supra note 1, at 645.
13. The opinion cites Pellman v. Herms, 87 N.M. 410, 534 P.2d 112 (Ct. App. 1975) and
Davis v. Dept. of Health and Social Services, 87 N.M. 79, 499 P.2d 1001 (Ct. App. 1972).
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In closing, Judge Hemandez refers to the dissenting opinion and
offers further explanation of the reasoning followed by the Court.
But, even with this reference, it is impossible to reconcile the two
opinions. Within the first paragraph of Judge Lopez's dissent, a con-
fusion between the two sides is apparent. The minority opinion
states that the majority has failed to review the relevant statutory
authority given to the Board and that statutory authority can be
found for the Board to make such regulation amendments for the
reasons the board has given in presenting its case.'"
Judge Lopez states' I that pursuant to § 201 of the Air Quality
Control Regulations,' 6 standards are not designed to "provide a
sharp dividing line between air of satisfactory quality and air of
unsatisfactory quality." Under the Federal Clean Air Act,' ' New
Mexico must submit a plan specifying how the State will meet the
national standards for sulfur dioxide emissions.' 8 He points out that
New Mexico's plan was rejected insofar as it related to sulfur dioxide
emission controls in the Four Corners area because it failed to meet
stricter standards adopted by the Federal Environmental Protection
Agency. The Federal Environmental Protection Agency had pro-
posed acceptance of the amendment that was the subject of this
litigation.
Continuing to rely upon the New Mexico Air Quality Control
Act' I and the record before the Court, Judge Lopez reviews the
Board's reasons for adopting the amendment. He notes that the
Board has the authority to deny a permit for any new sources which
emit any hazardous air pollutant.2 0 This is also backed by the
federal provision2 ' which provides new permits must be denied if
granting them will allow pollutants at a level above the standard
applied by the Board.
Defining the fundamental issue of the case to be the substantive
manner in which emission regulations are measured and defined,
Judge Lopez states his view of the Board's position:
The standard does not control the emissions regulations; different
factors were stressed in arriving at a standard than in arriving at a
permissible emission level. The Board argues that its statutory
14. Supra note 1, at 646-47.
15. Supra note 1, at 645-46.
16. New Mexico Air Quality Control Act, § 12-14-1 N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl. Vol. 3, Supp.
1975).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1957 et seq. (1976).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 c-5(a)(1) (1975).
19. Supra note 16.
20. Supra note 16, § 12-14-7(C)(3).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 c-5(a)(2)(D) (1976).
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mandate requires it to set the emission regulation after examination
of various considerations; it is not directed to merely select a stan-
dard and then tailor the emissions regulation to fit it.2 2 (emphasis
added)
Judge Lopez then finds support for the Board's position directly
from the enabling statute. 2 3 Pointing out that the term "regula-
tions" includes "standards," he concludes that the legislative intent
was to require the Board to consider the public interest as well as
social and economic factors before making both regulations and
standards. This is buttressed by the definition of "air pollution" as
defined in the Act: 2 "air contaminants in such quantities and dura-
tion as may with reasonable probability injure human health, animal
or plant life, . . ." Since the Board "prevents and abates" 2 I air pollu-
tion, it can therefore enforce regulations that are concerned with air
pollution of less hazardous properties than that which will "with
reasonable probability injure human health, animal or plant life."
Also, further indication of this legislative intent can be found in the
statute 2 6 and in case law which indicates that local boards may
promulgate stricter regulations than those established by the state.2 7
After showing the Board is not compelled to set regulations to
meet the standard, the remaining task, according to Justice Lopez is
whether the Board acted in accordance with the law. Referring to
reasons "A" and "F" given by the Board, which concerned the
proposed pollutant level requirements and the fact that under the
present standards one source could preempt all other sources, Judge
Lopez recognizes the problem addressed by the Board: The present
1972 regulations allow pollution up to the level of the standards,
thus preventing any new industry which produces any pollution.
While the majority opinion contends the Board has no authority to
regulate on that basis, Judge Lopez finds that authority in the en-
abling statute.2 The definition of "public interest" is broad enough,
in his view, "to permit the Board to weigh how the public will best
be served" and to consider the social and economic value of the new
22. Supra note 1, at 646.
23. § 12-14-5 N.M. Stat. Ann. (Repl. Vol. 3 Supp. 1975) reads in part: "In making its
regulations, the Board shall give weight it deems appropriate to all facts and circumstances
including but not limited to ... (b) the public interest, including the social and economic
value of the sources and subjects of air contaminants." (emphasis added)
24. See § 12-14-2 (B) N.M. Stat. Ann. (Repl. Vol. 3, Supp. 1975).
25. See § 12-14-5 (B) (1) N.M. Stat. Ann. (Repl. Vol. 3, Supp. 1975).
26. § 12-14-2 (B) N.M. Stat. Ann. (Repl. Vol. 3, Supp. 1975).
27. Citing Wylie C.C. v. Albuquerque-Bernalillo C.A.C.B, 80 N.M. 633, 459 P.2d 159 (Ct.
App. t969).
28. § 12-14-2 (B) (1) (b) N.M. Stat. Ann. (Repl. Vol. 3, Supp. 1975).
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industries which the area expects to attract.2 9 Judge Lopez warns
that none of these considerations are limited in time and furthermore
that "the Board could be considered derelict in its duties if it did not
plan for the future effect of the decisions it makes today.""3
(emphasis added)
As to reason "B," Judge Lopez cites again to the statutes3 ' and
adds:
Practical reasons dictate that the Board is justified in acting to
obtain control over New Mexico's air. Unless the Board regains this
authority, the legislative intent that a new New Mexico agency deal
with questions of air quality, as indicated by establishing this Board,
will be frustrated. Further, if the Board continues to promulgate
regulations below the federal requirements, its actions will be with-
out effect, a result we cannot assume the legislature desired.32
As to the majority opinion regarding the interpretation of the
conflicting evidence, Judge Lopez feels the Court has overstepped
the boundaries of appellate review. He cites testimony from the
record which refutes that relied on in the majority opinion and con-
cludes that there is substantial evidence to support the Board's find-
ings.
Finally, in reference to the majority opinion's reliance on the
dictionary in order to show sulfur dioxide as a colorless gas, Judge
Lopez cites testimony given by the New Mexico Lung Association
and the Air Pollution Primer3 and introduced by the Board, which
supported its position that sulfur dioxide control is necessary to
prevent interference with visibility.
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS
THE LA W.
On the federal level, it has long been established that Congress
may delegate legislative powers.3" Because of disparities in the
29. Supra note 1, at 645.
30. Id.
31. § 12-14-3 N.M. Stat. Ann. (Repl. Vol. 3, Supp. 1975) states in part: "The Board is
the state air pollution control agency ... and may take all action necessary to secure this
state ... the benefits of such federal acts." See also 42 U.S.C. 1857 c-2(a) (1975), which
gives primary responsibility to each state to maintain the air quality standards in that state.
32. Supra note 29.
33. Citing National Tuberculosis and Respiratory Disease Association, New York, New
York 1971.
34. There are only two cases that have reached the U.S. Supreme Court in which con-
gressional delegation was ruled invalid for reasons of inadequacy and vagueness. Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241 (1935) and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837 (1935). The Court has specifically held
the phrases "public interest" and "public convenience or necessity" as adequate "standards"
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economic, social and political factors in state governments, any
development of meaningful standards to support delegation at the
state level has failed." Professor Davis, in his Administrative Law
Treatise, states:
Typically a regulatory agency must decide many major questions
that could not have been anticipated at the time of the statutory
enactment; typically, legislators are unable to write meaningful
standards that will be helpful in answering such major questions; and
typically, the protections lie much less in standards than in frame-
works of procedural safeguards plus executive, legislative or judicial
checks. 3
6
Delegation on the state level, while not differing greatly in theory
from the federal level, has been much slower in gaining acceptance
by the courts. While some courts have adopted the federal view, 3 I
the New Mexico Court of Appeals decision falls in the category
described by Professor Davis as "typical." 3  Proponents of a non-
delegation theory at the state level, such as Judge Hernandez, may be
able to justify their argument, by pointing to the lack of legislative
intent to delegate rule-making powers. The State Legislature in New
Mexico meets on a part-time basis, and because of personal sched-
ules, may not be able to devote the time necessary to develop stan-
dards to properly grant law-making powers. Legislative drafting may
be less skilled than that on the federal level, afid all too often closing
hours of sessions bring about the "last-ditch" efforts of special
interest groups3 9 slowing the legislative efficiency.
Here, however, the New Mexico Court of Appeals has ignored the
guidance of the United States Supreme Court concerning whether
authority has been delegated. As pointed out by Judge Lopez, the
for delegation. New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 53 S.Ct. 45
(1932) and Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond and Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 53
S.Ct. 627 (1933).
35. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES-TEXTS-PROBLEMS 36-37 (5th ed.
1973).
36. Id.
37. Barry and Barry v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 81 Wash.2d 155, 500 P.2d 540
(1972). Matz v. Curtis Cartage Co., 132 Ohio 237, 7 N.E.2d 220 (1937).
38. Supra note 35, at 39-40:
The typical state court opinon strings together some misleading cliches about
standards and announces the conclusion. ... (It) fails to say anything about
(1) the reasons for the legislative choice to make the particular delegation, (2)
the practical consequences of allowing the legislature to do what it is trying to
do ... (5) the need for protection against unfairness, arbitrariness, and favor-
itism, (6) the importance of procedural safeguards ... or (7) the need for
providing help to the Legislature in its search for practical and efficient ways
of accomplishing (its) objectives.
39. Id.
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same enabling phrase which has permitted delegation on the federal
level for over forty years,4" Section 12-14-5(b) of the New Mexico
Statutes Annotated, 4 ' grants the Board the power to concern itself
with "public interest." The majority opinion becomes tangled in the
web of standards and regulations, failing to review the legislative
intent, the procedural safeguards of the agency, or the practical
consequences of upholding the Board's decision. Finally, it falls short
of teaching the legislature a method of accomplishing its intent.
CONCLUSION
In reading the two opinions of the case, one must wonder how the
two could be concerned with the same case. Because the majority
fails to meet head-on with the dissent, they do not form the two
sides of a legal argument. Judge Lopez, by dealing directly with the
statutes delegating authority to the Board, finds many areas in the
record which the majority refuses to address.
One must question the energy companies which spend thousands
of dollars each year to continue their legal battles for lower, less
restrictive standards, the same standards that have resulted in the air
pollution problem in the Four Corners area.
Finally, we must question the Court of Appeals for its "typical"
opinion in this case. Professor Davis first published his views on state
delegation in 1958, but the Courts have been slow in adopting any of
them. With more applications for new coal-fired electrical power
industries on the desks of the New Mexico Environmental Improve-
ment Agency, the Environmental Improvement Board plans to return
to the courts in the near future. Thus, arguments concerning air
pollution control authority in the Four Corners area will continue.
S. BERT ATKINS*
40. Supra note 34.
41. Supra note 23.
*In the 33rd Legislative Session of the State of New Mexico 1977 House Bill #199,
introduced by William E. Warren and Frank M. Bond, proposed an amendment to the Air
Quality Control Act. The amendment added one sentence to the Act which read: "Regula-
tions prescribing air contaminant limitations applicable to sources, may be more restrictive
than necessary to meet air standards." The House General Session defeated the bill.
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